Winston Churchill
British wartime Prime Minister, opponent of appeasement (1874-1965)
Also known as: Churchill, Winston Churchill, Sir Winston Churchill
Sir Winston Leonard Spencer-Churchill (1874-1965) was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 1940-1945 and 1951-1955. Quigley treats Churchill as the exemplar of the British Establishment outsider-insider — born inside the upper class but ideologically apart from the The Milner Group's appeasement consensus, then elevated to the premiership when that consensus failed in May 1940. He had been one of the most vocal opponents of the 1935 India bill that Curtis drafted and of the appeasement policy of Chamberlain.
Establishment outsider
Born at Blenheim Palace into the Marlborough family, Churchill was the son of Lord Randolph Churchill, a Cecil-Bloc-adjacent Tory, and Jennie Jerome, an American heiress. Quigley locates him among the older imperial Tories who, like 'the older Tories, with their strong army connections, and others, like Winston Churchill, with an appreciation of military matters, did not see how England could face the military demands of the twentieth century without Indian military manpower, at least in colonial areas' (T&H 184). He was Conservative-then-Liberal-then-Conservative across his career, leading Lloyd George's wartime supporters during the strike-breaking of 1919-1926, then becoming Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer 1924-1929.
Return to the gold standard
As Chancellor under Baldwin (1924-1929), Churchill made the consequential 1925 decision to return Britain to the gold standard at the pre-war parity. Quigley's analysis: 'the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston Churchill, judging the price level by the exchange rate, believed that it had and went back on the gold standard at that point. As a result, sterling was overvalued and Britain found itself economically isolated' (T&H 345). The deflationary consequences contributed to the 1926 General Strike — itself fought partly with 'the British Gazette under Churchill,' a government strikebreaking news bulletin (T&H 500).
Opposition to the 1935 India Act
Quigley reads Churchill's most consequential pre-war role as his opposition to the 1935 Government of India Act, which Curtis had drafted and the The Milner Group had pushed through. 'The attack was led by Winston Churchill in the Commons and by Lords Lloyd, Salisbury, Midleton, and Sumner in the House of Lords' (AAE 182). Churchill 'had already revealed his opinion of the bill over the BBC when he said, on 29 January 1935, that it was "a monstrous monument of sham built by the pygmies"' (AAE 184). Quigley reads this as Churchill's clearest pre-war attack on the Group: 'It is quite clear that Churchill believed his charge and was referring to what we have called the Milner Group, although he would not name them' (AAE 185).
Wartime premiership
When Chamberlain's government fell in May 1940, Churchill — alone among the senior Conservatives — was acceptable as Prime Minister to both the Conservative Party and the Labour opposition. He led the war government to victory in May 1945, only to lose the general election that July. Quigley notes that, at Casablanca and elsewhere, Stalin told Churchill that twelve million Soviet peasants had died in the collectivization of agriculture (T&H 411). On post-war policy, Quigley records that 'Churchill, Eden, Macmillan, and Douglas-Home after 1951 represents the propertied classes and still continues to show strong banking influence' (T&H 517) — Churchill's 1951-1955 second premiership being institutionally continuous with the older Conservative establishment.
Quigley's reservations
Quigley does not idolize Churchill. He records: 'prominent British political personages such as Lord Halifax, Churchill, and J. Wheeler-Bennett have tried to convey the impression that Germany had overwhelming military force in 1937-1940. This impression has, unfortunately, been generally accepted in America' (Quigley Misc, 3) — a claim Quigley argues the captured German military records refute. Reviewing the inter-war memoirs in 1962, he notes: 'We now have two villains (Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain) and two heroes (Eden and Churchill). The latter pair have now given their own versions of events, while the other two are defended by biographers... not because the former pair shared correct ideas at the time (in fact they disagreed on much), but simply because their advice was not followed' (Book Reviews, 156).
Cited in
- anglo-american-establishment · p. 182 Quigley
The attack was led by Winston Churchill in the Commons and by Lords Lloyd, Salisbury, Midleton, and Sumner in the House of Lords. None of these except Churchill openly attacked the government's policy.
- anglo-american-establishment · p. 184 Quigley
subjected to a long-sustained barrage from Winston Churchill. Churchill had already revealed his opinion of the bill over the BBC when he said, on 29 January 1935, that it was 'a monstrous monument of sham built by the pygmies.'
- anglo-american-establishment · p. 185 Quigley
It is quite clear that Churchill believed his charge and was referring to what we have called the Milner Group, although he would not name them.
- tragedy-and-hope · p. 345 Quigley
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston Churchill, judging the price level by the exchange rate, believed that it had and went back on the gold standard at that point. As a result, sterling was overvalued and Britain found itself economically isolated.
- tragedy-and-hope · p. 499 Quigley
Winston Churchill as chancellor of the exchequer carried out the stabilization policy which put England on the gold standard with the pound sterling at the prewar rate of parity.
- book-reviews · p. 156 Quigley
Clearly Churchill and Eden are heroes now, while Baldwin and Chamberlain are the villains of the piece, not because the former pair shared correct ideas at the time (in fact they disagreed on much), but simply because their advice was not followed.
- quigley-misc · p. 3 Quigley
prominent British political personages such as Lord Halifax, Churchill, and J. Wheeler-Bennett have tried to convey the impression that Germany had overwhelming military force in 1937-1940. This impression has, unfortunately, been generally accepted in America.