The Instrument of Expansion Theory
Quigley's mechanism for civilizational growth: every expanding civilization is organized around an instrument that drives saving, invention, and investment — and which inevitably institutionalizes and chokes off further growth
Also known as: Instrument of Expansion, Organization of Expansion, Surplus-Creating Instrument, Instrument vs Institution
The Instrument of Expansion theory is the analytical engine beneath Quigley's seven-stage model. Every civilization, he argues in The Evolution of Civilizations, is organized around a specific instrument of expansion — an organization that simultaneously incentivizes invention, accumulates surplus, and applies that surplus to new ways of doing things. So long as this organization remains an instrument (i.e. is used for its function), the civilization expands. Once it becomes an institution (i.e. its members come to value its preservation over its function), the rate of expansion falls and the civilization enters its Age of Conflict.
Statement of the theory
Quigley introduces the theory in Chapter 5 of The Evolution of Civilizations: "By the term 'instrument of expansion' we mean that the society must be organized in such fashion that three things are true: (1) the society must be organized in such a way that it has an incentive to invent new ways of doing things; (2) it must be organized in such a way that somewhere in the society there is accumulation of surplus — that is, some persons in the society control more wealth than they wish to consume immediately; and (3) it must be organized in such a way that the surplus which is being accumulated is being used to pay for or to utilize the new inventions" (EoC 119). Translated into the language of economics, the three conditions are invention, saving, and investment, "but the terms used by economists are generally so ambiguous to noneconomists that we hesitate to use them" (EoC 119). When a producing society satisfies all three, Quigley calls it a civilization — and the theory's claim is that such a civilization will expand, and will expand only as long as the three conditions continue to be met.
The three elements — invention, saving, investment
Quigley spends pages 119-124 of The Evolution of Civilizations unpacking each element with examples. Invention is not a function of biology or necessity: "Inventiveness depends very largely on the way a society is organized. Some societies have powerful incentives to invent, because they are organized in such a way that innovation is encouraged and rewarded" (EoC 121). Slave societies — Classical civilization, the antebellum American South — are notoriously uninventive because neither slaves nor slaveowners have any interest in invention (EoC 121). Accumulation of surplus requires inequitable distribution: "some persons must have more than they need, even if others must have less than they need" (EoC 122). With his "100 meals a day" thought experiment Quigley illustrates how an equal distribution (Type A) precludes any growth, while a concentrated distribution (Type B) permits surplus to be invested (Type C) so that the system can grow (EoC 122-123). Investment is the application of accumulated surplus to new inventions, and is in Quigley's analysis the element most likely to break down: "the one that usually breaks down is the third — application of surplus to new ways of doing things" (EoC 125). All three elements must be present together; "the surplus-creating instrument, by controlling the surplus and thus the disposition of it, will also control investment and will, thus, have at least an indirect influence on the incentive to invent" (EoC 124).
The instrument is not necessarily economic
A crucial — and frequently missed — feature of Quigley's theory is that the surplus-creating instrument can take any of several forms. "This surplus-creating instrument does not have to be an economic organization. In fact, it can be any kind of organization, military, political, social, religious, and so forth" (EoC 125). His list of historical examples is the canonical statement: "In Mesopotamian civilization it was a religious organization, the Sumerian priesthood to which all members of the society paid tribute. In Egyptian, Andean and, probably, Minoan civilizations it was a political organization, a state that created surpluses by a process of taxation or tribute collection. In Classical civilization it was a kind of social organization, slavery, that allowed one class of society, the slaveowners, to claim most of the production of another class in society, the slaves. In the early part of Western civilization it was a military organization, feudalism. . . . In the later period of Western civilization the surplus-creating instrument was an economic organization (the price-profit system, or capitalism, if you wish)" (EoC 125). The same theory thus accommodates very different societies: it is not a theory about capitalism but a theory about surplus, and capitalism is only one of its instantiations.
Instrument becomes institution
The decisive move of the theory is the claim that every instrument of expansion, in time, becomes an institution — and that the conversion is what destroys the civilization. "Like all instruments, an instrument of expansion in the course of time becomes an institution and the rate of expansion slows down. . . . This decrease in the rate of investment occurs for many reasons, of which the chief one is that the social group controlling the surplus ceases to apply it to new ways of doing things because they have a vested interest in the old ways of doing things. They have no desire to change a society in which they are the supreme group" (EoC 125-126). The surplus is now spent on "ostentatious display, competition for social honors or prestige, construction of elaborate residences, monuments, or other structures" (EoC 126). See Instrument-to-Institution Transition for the broader concept of which the instrument-to-institution conversion is one instance. The institutionalized instrument no longer expands the civilization; it merely defends its own privileges, and it is this defense that produces the class conflicts, imperialist wars, and irrationality of the Age of Conflict.
Three responses — reform, circumvention, reaction
Once the instrument has institutionalized, the civilization faces a choice. "The growing tension of evolution and the clashes it engenders can result in one of the three possible outcomes to the crisis. These are (1) reform, (2) circumvention, or (3) reaction" (EoC 131). Reform rearranges the existing instrument; circumvention lets a new instrument grow up alongside the old; reaction prevents both. Quigley's example — and his hope — is Western civilization, where two successful circumventions and one reform have produced three periods of expansion. "The instrument of expansion in the first was feudalism, which became institutionalized into chivalry. This was circumvented by a new instrument of expansion that we might call commercial capitalism. When this organization became institutionalized into mercantilism, it was reformed into industrial capitalism, which became the instrument of expansion of the third age of expansion in the history of Western civilization. By 1930 this organization had become institutionalized into monopoly capitalism, and the society was, for the third time, in a major era of crisis" (EoC 132). The political horizon of Quigley's later work is the question of whether a fourth circumvention can replace monopoly capitalism — and what shape such a new instrument might take.
Why the theory matters
The instrument-of-expansion theory is the analytical core of every other piece of Quigley's mature thought. The seven-stage model is the visible periodization that the theory produces. Weapons systems theory extends the same instrument-vs-institution logic to military organization. The economic chapters of Tragedy and Hope (especially the long argument about financial capitalism, the gold standard, and central banking) read the twentieth-century crisis of the West as the institutionalization of industrial capitalism into monopoly and financial capitalism, with the The Milner Group and its sister networks as the vested-interest groups defending the institutionalized form. In his late Georgetown lectures, Quigley generalized the move beyond civilizations: "It is a basic rule of social processes that instruments tend to become institutionalized and that institutionalization leads to decreased effectiveness in achieving macro-goals. . . . This phenomenon can be observed in any society in all its activities, from churches where religion is replaced by clericalism, through schools where the struggle for credits, curriculum, and examinations become obstacles to real education, to the military aspect where weapons, inter-service animosities, SOP, and thirst for promotions become threats to defense and even to national security" (Quigley Lectures, 52).
Cited in
- evolution-of-civilizations · p. 119 Quigley
By the term 'instrument of expansion' we mean that the society must be organized in such fashion that three things are true: (1) the society must be organized in such a way that it has an incentive to invent new ways of doing things; (2) it must be organized in such a way that somewhere in the society there is accumulation of surplus. . .; and (3) it must be organized in such a way that the surplus which is being accumulated is being used to pay for or to utilize the new inventions.
- evolution-of-civilizations · p. 120 Quigley
Inventiveness depends very largely on the way a society is organized. Some societies have powerful incentives to invent, because they are organized in such a way that innovation is encouraged and rewarded.
- evolution-of-civilizations · p. 122 Quigley
'Accumulation of surplus' means that some persons or organizations in the society have more wealth passing through their control than they wish to use immediately. . . . This is so necessary to expansion that it means that some persons must have more than they need, even if others must have less than they need.
- evolution-of-civilizations · p. 125 Quigley
Like all instruments, an instrument of expansion in the course of time becomes an institution and the rate of expansion slows down. This process is the same as the institutionalization of any instrument, but appears specifically as a breakdown of one of the three necessary elements of expansion. The one that usually breaks down is the third — application of surplus to new ways of doing things.
- evolution-of-civilizations · p. 125 Quigley
This surplus-creating instrument does not have to be an economic organization. In fact, it can be any kind of organization, military, political, social, religious, and so forth. In Mesopotamian civilization it was a religious organization, the Sumerian priesthood. . . . In Classical civilization it was a kind of social organization, slavery.
- evolution-of-civilizations · p. 126 Quigley
The social group controlling the surplus ceases to apply it to new ways of doing things because they have a vested interest in the old ways of doing things. They have no desire to change a society in which they are the supreme group.
- evolution-of-civilizations · p. 131 Quigley
We speak of reform when the organization of expansion is rearranged so that it ceases to be an institution and becomes an instrument once more. We speak of circumvention when. . . a new instrument of expansion. . . grows up alongside the older institution and takes over the latter's expansive functions. We speak of reaction when the privileged vested-interest groups are able to prevent either reform or circumvention.
- evolution-of-civilizations · p. 132 Quigley
The instrument of expansion in the first was feudalism, which became institutionalized into chivalry. This was circumvented by a new instrument of expansion that we might call commercial capitalism. When this organization became institutionalized into mercantilism, it was reformed into industrial capitalism.
- quigley-lectures · p. 50 Quigley
A producing society becomes a civilization when it is organized in such a way that its patterns of relationships and behavior provide three things: (a) an incentive to innovate new ways of doing things; (b) an inequitable distribution of the social product so that there accumulates within the society a surplus of wealth. . .; and (c) that the society be organized in such a way that the surplus being accumulated is used to mobilize resources to exploit the innovations being made.
- quigley-lectures · p. 52 Quigley
The reason for the decreasing rate of expansion is that the organization of expansion ceases acting as an instrument of expansion and becomes an institution. The tendency for all organizations to begin as instruments and to end as institutions is a general characteristic of all organizational patterns of any kind.