The Seven Stages of Civilizational Evolution

Statement of the theory

In Chapter 5 of The Evolution of Civilizations ("Historical Change in Civilizations") Quigley names seven stages through which every civilization passes: "1. Mixture, 2. Gestation, 3. Expansion, 4. Age of Conflict, 5. Universal Empire, 6. Decay, 7. Invasion" (EoC 133). The number is not metaphysical — he is explicit that "these divisions are largely arbitrary and subjective and could be made in any convenient number of stages" (EoC 132) — but seven "permits us to relate our divisions conveniently to the process of rise and fall" (EoC 133). What is not arbitrary is the causal mechanism that drives the sequence: each civilization possesses an instrument of expansion (an organization of saving, invention, and investment) that drives stages 2 and 3, then institutionalizes — and the institutionalization is what produces stages 4 through 7. "The pattern of change in civilizations presented here consists of seven stages resulting from the fact that each civilization has an instrument of expansion that becomes an institution. The civilization rises while this organization is an instrument and declines as this organization becomes an institution" (EoC 119). The whole apparatus of the theory hangs on that single sentence.

The seven stages

Stage 1 — Mixture. A new civilization is born from the fusion of two or more cultures on the periphery of an older one. "Civilizations have generally arisen on the periphery of earlier civilizations" (EoC 135) — Canaanite, Hittite, and Minoan on the edge of Mesopotamia; Classical on the edge of Minoan; Western on the edge of Classical. Most mixtures fail; only rarely does a new producing society emerge equipped with an instrument of expansion.

Stage 2 — Gestation. "A period in which the society seems to be changing very little. . . . But, under the surface, much of importance is taking place and, above all, the process of investment and invention that will make possible the following period of expansion is taking place" (EoC 135).

Stage 3 — Expansion. Marked by four kinds of growth: "(a) increased production of goods. . .(b) increase in population. . .(c) an increase in the geographic extent of the civilization. . .and (d) an increase in knowledge" (EoC 136). "This period of expansion is frequently a period of democracy, of scientific advance, and of revolutionary political change" (EoC 136). The civilization divides into a core area and a peripheral area, the latter growing faster than the former.

Stage 4 — Age of Conflict. "Probably the most complex, most interesting, and most critical of all the seven stages. It is marked by four chief characteristics: (a) it is a period of declining rate of expansion; (b) it is a period of growing tension of evolution and increasing class conflicts. . .; (c) it is a period of increasingly frequent and increasingly violent imperialist wars; and (d) it is a period of growing irrationality, pessimism, superstitions, and otherworldliness" (EoC 137). See Age of Conflict.

Stage 5 — Universal Empire. "As a result of the imperialist wars of the Age of Conflict, the number of political units in the civilization is reduced. Eventually one unit emerges triumphant. When this occurs we are in Stage 5" (EoC 140). The new empire "seems to the periods that follow it" to be a golden age — peace, prosperity, common coinage and weights — "but this appearance of prosperity is deceptive" (EoC 145-146). See Universal Empire (concept).

Stage 6 — Decay. "A period of acute economic depression, declining standards of living, civil wars between the various vested interests, and growing illiteracy. . . . New religious movements begin to sweep over the society. There is a growing reluctance to fight for the society or even to support it by paying taxes" (EoC 146).

Stage 7 — Invasion. "The Stage of Invasion. . .when the civilization, no longer able to defend itself because it is no longer willing to defend itself, lies wide open to 'barbarian invaders.' These invaders are 'barbarians' only in the sense that they are 'outsiders.' Frequently these outsiders are another, younger, and more powerful civilization" (EoC 147).

The mechanism — institutionalization

The seven stages are not a freestanding typology; they are the visible surface of a single underlying process — the institutionalization of the instrument of expansion. "Like all instruments, an instrument of expansion in the course of time becomes an institution and the rate of expansion slows down. This process is the same as the institutionalization of any instrument, but appears specifically as a breakdown of one of the three necessary elements of expansion. The one that usually breaks down is the third — application of surplus to new ways of doing things" (EoC 125). The vested-interest group that controls the surplus "ceases to apply it to new ways of doing things because they have a vested interest in the old ways of doing things. They have no desire to change a society in which they are the supreme group" (EoC 126). The unspent surplus drifts into "ostentatious display, competition for social honors or prestige, construction of elaborate residences, monuments" (EoC 126). The decreasing rate of investment is what carries the civilization from Stage 3 into Stage 4; the political and military convulsions of Stage 4 are downstream effects of that economic shift. As Quigley summarizes in his late lectures: "It is a basic rule of social processes that instruments tend to become institutionalized and that institutionalization leads to decreased effectiveness in achieving macro-goals" (Quigley Lectures, 52).

Reform, circumvention, and reaction

The transition from Stage 3 to Stage 4 is the one point in the sequence where Quigley believes a civilization has real choice. "The growing tension of evolution and the clashes it engenders can result in one of three possible outcomes to the crisis. These are (1) reform, (2) circumvention, or (3) reaction" (EoC 131). Reform rearranges the existing instrument so that it ceases to be an institution and becomes an instrument once more. Circumvention leaves the vested-interest groups intact but allows a new instrument of expansion to grow up alongside the old one and take over its expansive functions. Reaction is the case where the vested interests successfully prevent both, and decline becomes chronic. Quigley's own civilization is his showcase for reform-and-circumvention: "Western civilization has had three periods of expansion, the first about 970-1270, the second about 1420-1650, and the third about 1725-1929. The instrument of expansion in the first was feudalism, which became institutionalized into chivalry. This was circumvented by a new instrument of expansion that we might call commercial capitalism. When this organization became institutionalized into mercantilism, it was reformed into industrial capitalism. . . . By 1930 this organization had become institutionalized into monopoly capitalism, and the society was, for the third time, in a major era of crisis" (EoC 132). The possibility of a fourth circumvention is the political-theoretical horizon of his last writings.

Application and reception

The bulk of The Evolution of Civilizations (chapters 6-10) is a test of the seven-stage model against five civilizations — Mesopotamian, Canaanite, Minoan, Classical, and Western — with running comparison to Sinic, Hindu, Islamic, and Byzantine. Each civilization is placed on the seven-stage curve and the date of each transition is named. The same machinery shapes the global narrative of Tragedy and Hope: the twentieth-century crisis is read as the third Age of Conflict of Western civilization, with the United States as the likely candidate for universal-empire status "if it is not reformed or circumvented" (cf. EoC 141). Reviewers praised the book as "sounder ground than. . . Arnold J. Toynbee" (EoC 2, jacket copy from the Christian Science Monitor). Quigley's later students and editors treated the seven-stage model as the master frame for his other work: Harry Hogan's foreword to Weapons Systems and Political Stability reads weapons history as an extension of the same theory of civilizational rise and fall (WS 7-8).